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WITTGENSTEIN'S "LANGUAGE-GAME"-A TOOL FOR 
COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTALISTS 
ELIZABETH T. CARPENTER 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588 
During the last seventeen years of his life, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
in several works, set out his remarkable concept of the "language-
game" -a notion of understanding language that focused attention upon 
the ways in which we use language in actual situations as one might 
focus on the ways players move pieces in a game. I propose that this 
concept (with slight modifications) be included among the cognitive 
developmentalist's tools for analysis. It is useful in describing the 
growth of some important communicative abilities an individual devel-
ops from infancy to fluency in the uses of expressions of the language 
of his culture. A sketch of the salient features of the "language-game" 
is presented, along with examples of its application to some typical 
samples of data. 
As an analytic instrument, the "language-game" concept pos-
sesses sufficient flexibility to deal realistically with the various con-
ceptual patterns one meets in ordinary situations and allows enough 
clarity of description to make replicability of application readily 
possible. These are exactly the qualities the developmentalist needs in 
instruments with which he must make sense of data gathered within 
the dynamic surrounding of ordinary human communicative activities. 
t t t 
INTRODUCTION 
In his later philosophical works (post-1933), Ludwig 
Wittgenstein presents his notion of the "language~me" as 
an essential part of his method in working with difficulties 
which he thought resulted in philosophical problems. In this 
paper I shall present the key aspects in the concept of ''lan-
guage-games" which would enable one to recognize specific 
instances of a language game and to describe them; then I 
shall illustrate the steps by which a person develops his com-
petence in operating within a given language game. The point 
will be to show how the ''language-game'' concept may pro-
vide an instrument for the comparison of language behavior 
at different levels of development so as to define what sorts 
of behavioral changes constitute cognitive or conceptual 
"growth."· 
The following are key aspects of Wittgenstein's ''lan-
guage-game" concept. First, the focus of this concept is on 
the "speaking of the language" as only one part of an activity 
*Since every reference used in this paper is to one of the works 
of Wittgenstein listed at the end, only specific citations will be given in 
the text: P.I. will be used for Philosophical Investigations; Bl.B. for 
The Blue Book; and B.B. for The Brown Book. 
which has some point, or end, to which the speaking marked-
ly contributes (p.1. :§23). Second, the child develops his 
understanding of his mother-tongue by way of his participa-
tion in the various forms of the activities in which speaking 
has a role (Bl.B. :17). Third, learning a new language is learn-
ing new behavior with regard to a particular end (p.1. :§244). 
Fourth, if we organize our observations of ordinary activities 
that involve language according to the place of the words in 
relation to the point of the activity, the aspects of "system" 
and "regularity" appear, much as we would expect them in 
the playing of a "game" (p.1. :§207). Early in The Brown Book, 
Wittgenstein (B.B. :81) sketches descriptions of different sorts 
of activities in which vocal expressions are used with regular-
ity, along with gestures, in the course of pursuing some end. 
He refers to these as "systems of communication," saying: 
They are more or less akin to what in ordinary 
language we call games .... When the boy or 
grown-up learns what one might call special tech-
nical languages, e.g., the use of charts and dia-
grams, descriptive geometry, chemical symbolism, 
etc., he learns more language games .... 
What sorts of activities Wittgenstein has in mind may 
be seen if we do as he suggests: 
· .. Review the multiplicity of language-games in 
the following examples, and in others: 
Giving orders, and obeying them-
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving 
its measurements, ... Reporting an event-
· .. Forming and testing a hypothesis-
· .. Making up a story; and reading it-
· .. Playacting-
· .. Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying." 
(p.1.,23) 
These are to be regarded as quite ordinary to human behavior, 
for ". . . Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting are 
as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drink-
ing, playing" (p.I.:§25). The character of the surroundings 
which are part of the context for our playing these "games" 
have direct bearing on the character of the games, the point 
of the activities, etc. (p.I. :§142, re: ''normal'' and "abnormal 
cases"). 
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Several of the ''language games" Wittgenstein mentions 
are activities in which the players interact in a certain sequence 
so that taking turns is not an uncommon characteristic of the 
playing, particularly in stylized games involving more than one 
player. In such situations, each player's tum within the whole 
activity may be looked on as a "move"; his adeptness within 
a game, as a quickness or finesse in his "moving"; his compe-
tence in playing, as measured by his "knowing how to go on." 
And something like a sense of moving in space is brought into 
the notion of "going on" by way of analogies with "rmding 
one's way about" in a labyrinth (p.I.:§203) and in a section 
of a city (p.I. :§18), as though there were decisions to make 
along the way occasioned by the encounter of a "barrier" 
in the "pathway." 
All the above characteristics must be integrated in order 
to provide a guide for recognizing specific sets of behaviors 
as cases of the playing of a specific language game. It will be 
most strikingly apparent in examples. Here are descriptions of 
activities which we may consider instances of persons engaged 
in the first type of language game mentioned by Wittgenstein 
in the passage above (p.I. :§23)-the game of "giving orders 
and obeying them." 
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I. Think of the 9- to 12-month-old child who is able 
to get around his home by crawling and to reach 
. articles on the tables by pulling himself up near 
them. Adults in charge of the surroundings in 
which the baby must negotiate are quite often 
levying orders in the form of rules-"Don't touch!" 
and "No, No!"-along with the slap on the hand, 
the shake of the head, and the stem look. 
II. Around 18 months, having begun to use specific 
sound patterns in connection with specific activi-
ties, the baby, corning up to a table covered with 
objects, may be observed to reach out and touch 
one and then withdraw his hand, shake his head, 
and say, "No, No, No!" Then perhaps he goes on 
to other parts of the room and other activities. 
III. Further, in an encounter between that child and 
another some months later (about 30 months of 
age), the former slaps at the hand of his friend 
who has reached out to pick up the figurines on 
the table. The first acts in this sequence: first, 
saying, "No. No touch!"; then, if the friend does 
not react in a specific way (Le., by leaving the 
things alone), pushing the other out of the way, 
taking the figurine from his hand, and returning 
it to the table~all the while shaking his head' 
"No." 
IV. At 4 years old, the child asserts his authority over 
others in a play situation in which he's pretending 
to be the parent of another child and, in the act-
ing out, sets himself in the role of giving the other 
V. 
VI. 
the order, "Don't touch the glasses." When his 
playmate does not respond (in the acting out) 
so as to obey the command, but rather proceeds 
to pick up and play with the forbidden objects, 
the first child employs the hand slapping and-if 
that does not bring forth the reaction of ''leaving 
the objects alone" -the further response of 
"spanking the disobeying child." 
At such a point, children may well be seen 
to enact and re-enact this set of activities many 
times-and to take turns playing the roles of 
orderer and obeyer as well as disobeyer and 
punisher. And in the course of these actings-out, 
there may appear a number of sets of expressions, 
including: "I told you not to do that."-''You 
naughty boy!" -"I'm going to have to spank you."; 
or "If you don't quit that, I'm gonna give you a 
beating!"-''You better be good and don't touch 
them things!" There will, of course, be a number 
of variations in the ways specific children gram-
matically express themselves which will reflect 
the dialectal aspects of the societal groups to 
which they belong and, thus, the dialects with 
which they are directly familiar. 
At about the same time or very soon after the 
above, repeated role-playing occurs in the acti-
vities of the child; he begins to explore another 
sort of reaction to the order-giving act-Le., the 
use of the question ''Why?'' to lead the order-
giver to provide some expression of the forceful-
ness or importance of the order's being followed. 
During the ensuing 4 to 5 years, various sorts of 
possible "answers" occur in the game. Those grow 
to include the assertion of the "giver's" authority 
- "Because I say so" -the expression of the 
"giver's" desire or wishes-"Because I want to have 
it done"; and the laying out of probable conse-
quences to the act that are wanted or not-wanted-
"Because if you don't, you will get hurt." 
After the child is capable of entering into the facet 
of the game in which he concerns himself with 
possible "justifications" for the order-giving, he 
may enter into a similar consideration of the 
action which is a consequence of the following 
or the not-following, the obeying or the disobey-
ing. Thus, the result is the child's practice of 
judging the ''fairness'' or "fittingness" of the 
"reward" or "punishment." The child's concern 
proceeds in line with the growth of his socializa-
tion in that he goes from evaluation of the fair-
ness of the reward or punishment on the basis of 
whether he likes or wishes the action or object 
given, to the evaluation of the degree of severity 
of punishment in relation to the degree of diver-
sion of the individual's reaction to the order, 
taking into consideration other points of view, 
measures other than his own personal likes or 
dislikes. 
Review of the above examples of the child's behavior 
reveals that within his first four or five years he has picked up 
the following ways of handling himself within this sort of con-
text: (1) tum-taking or sequencing actions where the "order-
giving" behavior is expected to be followed by "follOwing" 
behaviors; (2) the order-giver acts to give some sort of force 
to bring the follower to comply in some way or other; thus, 
(3) the ''following'' is not automatic, making i:oom for the 
order-giver to wait to see if the follower behaves ''properly''; 
further, (4) the possibility of non-following behavior (''vio-
lating" or "disobeying" behavior) brings forth a place for 
retributive action by the giver, thus ''punishment'' and, 
alternatively, ''reward'' get fitted into the conceptual arrange-
ment; (5) in addition, the evaluative consideration of alterna-
tives in orders and justifications for orders and later of alter-
native retributive actions and their weights in relation to the 
behavior in pursuance of the order-giving are integrated into 
the whole activity at points which are conceptually appro-
priate to the language of the adult. 
In summary, I have indicated how Wittgenstein's con-
cept of ''language-game'' may be used to clarify certain aspects 
in the growth of the individual's competence in an area ofhis 
language. The aspects with which I have been concerned are 
of importance to the cognitive developmentalist, since they 
are involved in the development of the child's ability to oper-
ate within the communicative systems prevalent within his 
society. What is revealed in the development of the ability 
within the language game of "giving orders and following 
them" may be seen as the growth of the child's grasp of the 
conceptual grammar of that and similar activities of human 
interaction. 
I see in this an instrument for schematizing data of the 
child's activities with his mother-tongue which is both solid 
enough to allow the developmentalist reliability in applying 
the "game" model to data, and yet flexible enough to allow 
the points of actual behaviors to become the focus for any 
"game" description so that a comparison across ages is possi-
ble, as is essential for the developmentalist's instruments. 
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